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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
of frauds may not be-raised as a bar to granting relief by way of constructive trust
against unjust enrichment accomplished by abusing a confidential relationship 2 3
Charge Limiting Use of Evidence
The Court of Appeals, in an iction to recover brokerage commissions, held,
receipt in evidence of broker's unsuccessful efforts to sell property was not only
immaterial but in this case prejudicial error which was not cured by the trial
court's belated charge to limit the use of such evidence to corroboration.2 4
The rule of substantive law that a broker can not recover for his unsuccessful
efforts is basic2 5 The rule of adjective law upon which this case was decided must
by its very nature depend in its application upon the facts of the individual case.
There is, however, ample precedent for its use. An early case"s in referring to this
rule, said the effect of prejudicial evidence is not obviated by the judge's direction
to disregard it. This principle was again enunciated when the court on the basis of
the above decision held that the reception of this type of evidence was error which
was not cured by the charge.27 Again, in 1943, the Appellate Division said, "In
our opinion it may not be said that the hearsay statements ...were harmless
because the court instructed the jury to disregard them. 28 The rule as applied in
these cases depends in the main on whether the court in its discretion feels there
is a need for it.
Lis Pendens
Where plaintiff had filed a summons, complaint and notice of pendency of
action in county court, but had not served any defendant within sixty days after
filing,29 plaintiff was not entitled after cancellation of the notice to file another.3 0
The filing of lis pendens is a privilege3 ' granted by statute.82 Although other
23. Woocd v. Babe, 96 N. Y. 414 (1884); Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 145 N. Y. 313,
39 N. E. 1067 (1895).
24. Fred W. Hoch Assoc. v. Western News U., 308 N. Y. 461, 126 N. E. 2d 749
(1955).
25. Sibba. v. Bethlehem Iron Go, 83 N. Y. 378 (1881).
26. Erbin v. Lorillard, 19 N. Y. 299 (1859).
27. Arthur v. Griswad, 55 N. Y. 400 (1874).
28. Greenberg v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 266 App. Div. 685, 40 N. Y. S.
2d 494 (2d Dep't, 1943).
29. Civil Practice Act §12.
30. Israelson v. Bradley, 308 N. Y. 511, 127 N. E. 2d 313 (1955).
31. Cohen v. Biber, 123 App. Div. 528, 108 N. Y. Supp. 249 (2d Dep't 1908).
32. Note 1, supra.
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theories for cancellation of notice for failure to serve within the statutory time
limit have been advanced,3 3 the doctrine that failure to so serve is a form of
unreasonable neglect to proceed, and the court in its discretion may cancel,34 has
prevailed.35 The Court here did not decide this question, because here the can-
cellation was by consent, but it hinted that it was not satisfied that this was the
correct test, saying that the unreasonable neglect to proceed dealt with in C.P.A.
§123 applies only where an action has been commenced; i.e., a summons has been
served. .3
It has also been a general rule, if lis pendens has been cancelled because of
failure to commence an action, that another one cannot be filed.37 The underlying
theory is that the cancellation was an adjudication on the subject and determined
the rights of the parties in so far as they could be affected by the filing of a notice
of pendency. Otherwise, the statute would be negated,3 8 and hardship and injustice
would result.3 9 The decision in this case affirmed the existing rule disallowing
refiling after a cancellation has been effected, but has left confused the question of
whether such cancellation is mandatory or discretionary.
Prima Fade Case
When the plaintiff makes out a prima fade case and an appellate court
reverses on the ground that the jury verdict is against the weight of the evidence a
new trial must be granted. A dismissal of the complaint does not lie4" when the
plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right.41 Thus, a final judgment on
findings contrary to those made by the jury can not be given in such situations.42
In non-jury cases a reversal and dismissal is possible,43 but new findings of fact
are necessary."4
33. Note 3, supra. Lipschitz v. Watson, 113 App. Div. 408, 99 N. Y. Supp 418
(2d Dep't 1906).
34. Civil Practice Act §123.
35. Cohn v. Ratkowslcy, 43 App. Div. 196, 59 N. Y. Supp. 344 (1st Dep't 1899);
Lipschutz v. Horton, 55 Misc. 44, 104 N. Y. Supp. 850 (1907); Bhostack v. Haslcell,
116 Misc. 475, 190 N. Y. Supp. 174 (1921); Levy v. Kon, 114 App. Div. 795, 100 N. Y.
Supp. 205 (2d Dep't 1906); Nassau Lake Realty v. Hilts, 106 N. Y. S. 2d 216 (1951).
36. Civil Practice Act §218.
37. Shostack v. Haskell, note 35, supra,
38. ohen v. Ratkcowsky, note 35, supra.
39. Lipschutz v. Horton, note 35, supra.
40. Caldwell v. Nicolson, 235 N. Y. 209, 139 N. E. 243 (1923).
41. New York State Costitution, Art. I, sec. 2.
42. Imbrey v. Prudential Insurance Co., 286 N. Y. 434, 36 N. E. 2d 651 (1941);
N. Y. CONST., C. P. A. §584 (1).
43. NEw YoRK STATE CONsTITUTIoN, Art. 6 sec. 8; C. P. A. §584.
44. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 239.
